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Current Naval aviator selection and screening procedures
are based on the individual's statistical probability of
completing flight training and do not determine the capa-
bility of the student to adapt to an operational environment,
The resultant failure of some student aviators to complete
the advanced stages of training and the ineffective perfor-
mance of others in operational missions have caused a
considerable financial loss and a lessening of combat
readiness
.
A critical incident study, using 30 aviators who have
combat experience, indicates that there are 10 categories
of behavior which characterize effective and ineffective
Naval aviators. Procedures to identify these categories
early in flight training are discussed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The production of qualified effective combat pilots at
a minimum cost is an objective of any military flight
training activity. The U.S. Navy currently bases its
selection and secondary screening procedures on the
individual's statistical probability of successfully com-
pleting flight training. Very little emphasis is given to
determining the individual's capacity to adapt to the post-
training environment of operational aviation.
Operational Naval aviation includes a wide spectrum of
tasks. These tasks range from the transport pilot whose
job is to provide dependable logistic support in secure
areas, to the carrier based attack or fighter pilot whose
task is to inflict damage on the enemy in a combat situation.
A logical division of the tasks of operational aviation is
combat and non-combat. Specifically, combat pilots will be
considered to be those pilots whose mission is to operate
their aircraft as a weapons system in an environment which
includes a threat of enemy opposition. Combat missions
include attack, fighter, reconnaissance, and some search and
rescue and electronic warfare missions. Non-combat pilots
are those who perform a combat support role and who would
not normally operate in a hostile environment. Examples
of non-combat missions are: logistic transport, antisub-




It is reasonable to assume that a pilot who is competent
in a non-combat role may not be capable of operating a
complex weapons system in a hostile environment. The present
Navy selection and screening policies do not appear to
recognise this important difference. The purpose of this
project is to devise a criterion with which effective combat
performance can be predicted. Previous research on aviator
performance has centered on either success or failure in
flight training or on evaluation of effectiveness on comple-
tion of flight training. In order to be of maximum usefulness,
such criteria should be capable of identifying those individ-
ual student pilots who are potentially combat effective while
they are in the very early stages of training. Such a system
of early identification would not allow the use of a large
number of flight training grades as a predictor. The approach
taken in this project is to identify those categories of
behavior which characterize effective and ineffective combat
aviators. If such traits can be identified, and procedures
to identify them in flight students can be devised, at each
stage of training the individual student can be directed
toward that mission for which he is best suited. This would
not only eliminate the expense of the attrition of misplaced
students but would also increase the combat effectiveness
of the operational units to which prescreened graduates
are assigned.

II. THE PRESENT NAVAL AVIATION
SELECTION AND SCREENING SYSTEM
In the initial selection process Naval aviation candidates
are tested in five major areas: intelligence, physical fit-
ness, psychomotor skills, mechanical comprehension, and
background information. There are also the basic require-
ments of age (less than 26) and a college degree. With the
exception of the physical examination and the basic require-
ments, these attributes are measured by pencil and paper or
apparatus tests. The results of these tests are correlated
with the pass-fail dichotomy for the entire training command,
regardless of the ultimate employment of the aviators.
The physical examination includes, in addition to the
usual tests of physical fitness, visual acuity, etc.,
an interview with a Naval Flight Surgeon. The purpose of
the interview is to appraise the candidate's likelihood of
completing flight training. As an example of the lack of
relationship of this evaluation to the ultimate task of the
applicant, the U.S. Naval Flight Surgeon's Manual [1] in-
cludes the following guidance:
It is reasonable to suppose that any healthy, red-
blooded, interested American boy of normal intelligence
and social skills should be able to learn to fly the
Navy's aircraft completely.
After a flight student has commenced training, he
enters a secondary screening system which predicts his
probability of completing flight training based on his

flight and ground school grades [2]. This system was
constructed by taking all of the grades assigned to 2648
students and establishing, at different points in training,
the correlation of these grades to the pass- fail dichotomy.
This matrix of correlations was used to develop a linear
prediction equation for each point in time. This system
is designed for, and used principally by, training administra-
tors in making dispositions of students who have encountered
training difficulties.
One of the most important selections, with respect to
the student pilot's ultimate mission, occurs at the end of
primary flight training. At this point, the student enters
either the propeller or jet training "pipeline" for basic
and advanced training. This selection is significant in
that the majority of the students entering the jet pipeline
will ultimately be assigned to combat missions while those
assigned to the prop pipeline will be assigned to non-combat
missions. This selection is made primarily by using the
grades received on the first 12 training flights. Academic
grades are used for tie breakers.
On a weekly basis, the students who complete primary
training with the highest grades are accepted in the jet
pipeline, if they desire jet training. The cutoff grade is
variable, depending on the number of students who desire
jet training and the number who can be accepted by the jet
basic training squadrons. This number of openings is
highly variable depending on such factors as the previous

weather conditions and aircraft or instructor availability
at the jet training bases. Those students not desiring
or not accepted for jet training are automatically assigned
to the propeller pipeline.
One evaluation of the effectiveness of this system is
presented in a report prepared by the Naval Aerospace
Medical Research Laboratory (NAMRL) [3] . A survey was con-
ducted of flight surgeons attached to all deployed operational
Navy squadrons. Fifty-six percent of the flight surgeons
responded. These flight surgeons identified 144 aviators
as having unsatisfactory combat performance. The following
breakdown of data obtained concerning these aviators yielded:
24 men with whom other pilots refused to fly
43 men who turned in their wings
32 men who had their wings removed by Board action
' 22 men who were transferred administratively
23 men who were given non-flying duties
It is noteworthy that at the time of this survey a
large percentage of Naval aviation units were engaged in
combat operations in Southeast Asia.
This report does not identify these aviators by mission,
nor does it give the size of the population from which it
was drawn. However, this number of unsatisfactory aviators
probably represented a significant loss of combat effective-
ness for deployed aviation units.
A more specific study of potential aviator combat
effectiveness was conducted by the same organization by
studying the performance of newly designated aviators in
the jet Replacement Air Groups (RAG's) [4]. RAG training
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is that phase of a Naval aviator's career when he transitions
from a training environment to an operational environment.
A RAG student is taught by instructors with fleet experience
in operational aircraft and upon graduation should be fully
qualified to perform the mission of the operational squadron
to which he is assigned.
During a one-year period (November 1966-November 1967)
,
of 592 newly designated aviators assigned to jet RAG ' s , 131,
or 78 aviators, were attrited for reasons other than medical,
personal hardship, disciplinary action, or death. This
percentage exceeds the 8% attrition rate predicted by the
Student Pilot Prediction System for all student pilots
assigned to the jet pipeline in basic training.
The financial impact of this loss is considerable, as
the average cost per student completing jet training is
$129,183.00 and the average cost per student for RAG training
is $163,776.00 [5], The attrition of 78 aviators represents
an annual loss of between $10,086,274.00 and $22,850,802.00,




The problem of predicting military aviator effectiveness
or success has been explored extensively since the first use
of aircraft as weapons systems in World War I. The earliest
selection procedures were based on physical examinations to
ensure that the aviators had no physical defects. The
British Royal Flying Corps reported that of each 100 aviators
killed during the first year of its participation in World
War I, 90 had died because of their own "individual deficien-
cies," and of these, 60 were found to have been directly
due to "physical defects" [6]. Subsequent research during
this period described tests of mental alertness, reaction
time, judgment of the speed of moving objects, reasoning,
choice reactions, equilibrium differential, and tilt percep-
tion. However, very few of these tests were evaluated
adequately and their predictive validity was in doubt. The
psychologists of the period recognized the need for satis-
factory evidence of the validity of such tests as a basis
for acceptance of their utility for selection [7].
In the period between World War I and World War II, air-
crew selection research included coordination and psychomotor
tests, personality measures, and ability tests. Naval
research by A. Ickstadt and D. G. Sutton [8] drew attention
to the low correlation of rigid physical standards with
actual ability to fly an aircraft. Their conclusion was
10

that psychological examinations should be used to determine
aeronautical adaptability. Sutton specifically called
attention to the need for properly trained flight surgeons,
saying that medical officers having a superficial knowledge
of psychology were a liability rather than an asset. He
also stressed the need for follow-up and validation studies
on a large number of pilots. J. C. Flanagan, who conducted
research for the U.S. Army Air Forces during this period,
summarized the past work on pilot research as follows [9] '.
In summary, it can be said that in the summer of 1941
there was evidence from a number of samples that cer-
tain apparatus tests and possibly one or two paper-and-
pencil tests had predictive value for success in pilot
training. However, the samples for the recently tested
populations tended to be small and the results not
entirely consistent. Much additional research seemed
necessary before a satisfactory procedure for selecting
pilots could be based on established relationships.
During World War II substantial contributions were made
to aircrew selection procedures. The Army Air Forces
developed the Aviation Cadet Qualification Examination which
gave separate aptitude scores for pilot, bombardier and
navigator. This test was designed to measure aptitude
rather than specific knowledge obtained through formal
education or training. Subsequently the Aircrew Classification
Battery was developed to differentiate between aptitude as
a pilot, bombardier, navigator, or flight engineer. This
battery consisted of four apparatus tests of coordination and
reaction speed and 14 paper-and-pencil tests. This battery
had a validity of approximately 0.50 with the pass-fail
dichotomy in primary training [10].
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During the early part of World War II the Navy
developed the Flight Aptitude Rating (FAR). The FAR
included an intelligence test, a mechanical comprehension
test, and a background inventory. In 1942 the FAR had a
validity of 0.50 in predicting training success [11]. An
updated version of the FAR is still being used to screen
applicants for Naval Flight Training. The current version
consists of a mechanical comprehension test, a spacial
apperception test, and a background inventory. The FAR is
used in conjunction with the Aviation Qualification Test
(AQT) which is a general intelligence test. With a minimum
AQT stanine score of 3, the FAR predicts a completion rate
of from 50% of those applicants with a FAR stanine score of
3 or 4, to a 90% predicted completion rate for those with a
FAR stanine score of 9 [12].
The use of the pass-fail dichotomy as the primary criteria
for selection and screening of flight students 'has continued,
not only in the Navy as previously described, but in other
services. One of the more interesting applications of this
criterion is. reported by Jessup and Jessup [13] in which the
British Royal Air Force used the Eysenck Personality
Inventory to predict pilot training success. In this study
significant differences were found in the failure rates of
people falling in the four quadrants of the Neuroticism/
Extroversion personality space.
Subsequent to World War II, research has been conducted
on the combat effectiveness of pilots. One of the earliest
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efforts in this field was made by Douglas Bond, who as a
psychiatrist with the Army Air Forces observed several
thousand healthy and many emotionally disturbed aviators.
These observations of combat aviators led to his classic
work, The Love and Fear of Flying [14]. While Bond deals
largely with those pilots who "broke" in combat, he associ-
ates certain psychological characteristics with those
aviators who are particularly successful in combat. He
attributes their success to the gratification of some un-
conscious aggressive and libidinal drives which are
evidenced by their delight in expressing aggression in the
air and their love of flying. He also comments on the
difficulty of identifying men who have these drives.
During the Korean Conflict, Trites and Sells [15]
attempted to correlate combat performance and training data
for a group of U.S. Air Force pilots who had taken a battery
of tests at the beginning of flight training. While most of
their correlation coefficients were insignificant, an exami-
nation of their findings indicates that a psychological
rating based on all of the data available on an individual
while he was in flight training was significantly related to
the mean of combat peer/superior ratings (r = 0.32) and this
rating had a correlation with total number of combat flight
hours of 0.36. > "
An Air Force study was conducted in Southeast Asis in
1967 to determine the effects of training on F-4 second-
scater combat performance [16]. Among the results, it was
13

concluded that a task inventory could be utilized to determine
the effects of training programs on combat performance. It
could not be determined if this technique has been used in
further research on pilot combat performance.
In the previously cited study by the Naval Aerospace
Medical Research Laboratory (NAMRL) using a survey of flight
surgeons, of the 17 selection and training variables availa-
ble for the aviators identified as having unsatisfactory
combat performance, only the peer rating had possible value
in predicting combat performance.
In the study of Replacement Air Group (RAG) performance
by Bale, Rickus and Ambler [4], it was found that certain
grades assigned in flight training were significantly
related to pass-fail dichotomy in the RAG. A regression
analysis of these grades resulted in a predictor equation
with a correlation of 0.359 with success or failure in RAG
training. A predictor score was identified that would have
eliminated 41.4% of the unsuccessful RAG students and only
6.9% of the successful ones. This would have reduced the
RAG input by 11.51 but would have reduced the attrition
rate to 8.8%, or approximately that of students in the jet
pipeline. While this represents a substantial saving in the
cost of RAG training, the cost of training the 68 pilots
who would not be accepted for RAG training would still be
lost unless other employment, in an' aviation community in
which they would be successful, could be found.
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Additional development of an operational criterion for
the F-4 fighter community has been done by R. H. Shannon,
W. L. Waag and J. C. Ferguson of NAMRL [17, 18, and 19].
In their first study it was found that only five flight items
graded in the RAG accounted for 70% of the variance of the
final RAG grade. The multiple correlation of these items
with the final grade was 0.839. For a further study, 14
items, which had a multiple correlation of 0.852 with the
final grade in the East Coast F-4 RAG, were used to predict
the final grades for students in the West Coast F-4 RAG.
The resulting correlation between predicted and observed
grades was 0.776. As a result of these studies, a rating
form consisting of two criterion measures was conducted
and sent to the Commanding Officers of operational F-4
squadrons
.
The squadron Commanders were asked to rate the pilots,
on which RAG and training data had been compiled, on 17
significant items determined from the RAG studies and on
critical incidents; i.e., accidents, ramp strikes, wings
pulled, or other serious incidents. The individual results
on the 17-item rating were transformed to a standardized
Fleet Rating Score. A regression analysis for the Fleet
Rating Score resulted in a prediction equation containing
12 variables which were grades assigned in training or the
RAG, and which had a cumulative multiple correlation coeffi-
cient 0.476. However, only two of these variables, Flight
Aptitude Rating (FAR) and Primary Flight Grade, would have
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been of use in determining fleet performance in the early
stages of training, and these variables ranked as eight and
twelfth in importance.
Of the 101 pilots for whom critical incident information
was obtained, 25, or 24.8%, were "credited" with an incident.
The regression analysis for this dichotomous criterion
resulted in a prediction equation containing eight variables
having a correlation of 0.297. FAR ranked as the fourth
variable behind four RAG grades. The correlation between the
Fleet Rating and critical incident criteria was -.400.
While the sign of the correlation was in the expected
direction, its rather low magnitude seemed to suggest that
adequate operational flight performance in the F-4 (as
defined by the Fleet Rating Score) may not necessarily be
the same as adequate safe performance (as defined by the
lack of critical incidents).
In summary, while extensive research has been conducted
on the selection and screening of military pilots, the use
of an operational effectiveness criterion is a relatively
recent procedure. The current state of this research, as
represented by Shannon and Waag, is based on using data such
as flight grades as predictors. While the correlation of
these grades with • operational performance is significant,
the variables which explain most of the variance in the
operational performance criteria are not available until
the later stages of aviator training. This situation will
not eliminate those students who fail to complete training
16

because of misplacement or who are subsequently detected




In order to identify those pilot characteristics which
are associated with effective or ineffective combat aviators,
a critical incident procedure [20] was used in this project.
This procedure was chosen because it would allow descriptions
of a relatively wide latitude of behavior without using a
specific definition of combat effectiveness. This technique
would also eliminate the restrictions or bias of a task-
oriented questionnaire.
Combat effectiveness is a many-faceted concept, having
different meanings for different individuals. A specific
definition of combat effectiveness would either reflect the
bias of the individual making the definition or would be
virtually impossible to formulate using all of the individual
definitions available. For this reason, a specific defini-
tion was not used in this project. The behavioral charac-
teristics which evolved from using this method should be
representative of those associated with a general concept
of combat effectiveness.
The subjects for the experiment were 30 aviators from
the student population of the Naval Postgraduate School.
All of the subjects were volunteers. The only requirement
to participate was that each subject must have had combat
experience. All but one of the subjects were U.S. Navy
pilots or flight officers with combat experience in
Southeast Asia. The other subject was an Israeli Air Force
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officer who had participated in the Six Day War in 1966
and in subsequent combat operations. The following is a
breakdown of the subjects:
Rank (at the CDR (05) : 4 (Includes Israeli Officer)
time of the LCDR (04) : 6
incident) LT (03) : 11
LT(jg) (02): 9
Mission Fighter (VF) : 9
Attack (VA, VAH) : 10
Helicopter Attack (HAL) : 3
Electronic Warfare (VAQ, VQ, VAW) : 3
Antisubmarine Warfare (VP, VS , HS) : 4
Reconnaissance (RVAH) : 1
The average number of combat missions for all subjects was
178; the high was 600 and the low was 25.
An interview form (Appendix A) was constructed and used
by the interviewer in each case. The purpose of this form
was to ensure continuity of the information requested from
interview to interview. Each subject was given a copy of
the form so that he could read the instructions and refer
to the items during the interview.
After each subject had read the instructions and any
questions had been answered, he was asked to describe an
incident in which he had observed a pilot demonstrate
particularly effective combat performance. The interview
was conducted in an informal atmosphere and the subject
was encouraged to present his own opinions on why the per-
formance was particularly effective. If the subject did not
discuss why the individual's behavior or personality was
effective he was asked to comment specifically on this point
19

The same procedure was used to describe an incident
in which a pilot demonstrated particularly ineffective
performance. Rank and organization position were recorded
for the pilots described and personal data were recorded for
the subject. The entire interview was tape recorded for
further study.
To define those types of behavior which characterized
effective and ineffective combat pilots, four Naval aviators,
two with combat experience and two without, listened to 14
of the taped interviews and independently compiled a list
of the behavior mentioned in each case and the number of
cases in which each type of behavior was mentioned. When
this task was finished, a conference was held with the four
raters to resolve any semantic differences and a list of
eight categories of behavior which characterized effective
pilots and nine categories which characterized ineffective
pilots was constructed.
A rating form using these categories was constructed.
This form is shown in Appendix B. Three additional raters
listened to the tapes of the interviews and rated each
interview using this form. The behavior indicated in each
interview was assigned to a category if the rater thought the
behavior was an example of the behavior described by the cate-
gory. For each interview any number of the categories could
be designated as descriptive of the behavior described in
the interview. If the behavior could not be described by
one of the given categories it was listed specifically on
20

the form. Each category was marked only once for each
interview and categories describing ineffective aviators
were not allowed if the subject had designated the aviator
described in the interview as effective and vice versa.
The raters for this procedure were Navy attack or fighter
pilots with combat experience.
An analysis of the data was conducted to determine the
number of times each category was observed by one, two or
all three raters and the percentage of the total number of
categories observed accounted for by each category. The
percentage of the times that each category was marked by all
three raters was also calculated as a measure of how well
that category could be identified and utilized by raters.
A rating for each category was calculated by the following
formula:
Rating = Percentage of Total X Percentage Unanimous X 1000
Where percentage of total was calculated by dividing the
individual category total by the total number of all cate-
gories marked, and percentage unanimous was calculated by
dividing the number of times an individual category was
identified by all three raters by the individual category
total. This information is tabulated in Tables 1 and 2 for
effective and ineffective aviators, respectively.
Excerpts from the interviews describing the specific
behaviors which were identified unanimously, by category, are
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The categories on the Behavior Rating Form which were
identified by the first four raters account for 96.12%
of the behavior attributed to effective combat aviators and
92.401 of that attributed to ineffective combat aviators
by the 30 subjects. The remainder of the behavior was
identified as "other" on the Behavior Rating Form, as indi-
cated on Tables 1 and 2. These percentages indicate that
combat performance may be assessed by evaluating relatively
few aspects of an individual's behavior.
Seven of the categories which describe effective or
ineffective combat performance represent opposite, or at
least significantly different performance in the same
behavioral area. When these categories are combined, and
the ratings added, 10 categories result which can be
ranked as in Table 3.
The results in Table 3 indicate that some of the combined
categories tend to be indicative of effective aviators and
others indicative of ineffective aviators. Thus, the ability
to function effectively in stress situations and to communi-
cate efficiently is more indicative of effective aviators
than the lack of these abilities is reflective of ineffective
aviators. By the same reasoning, poor capacity for making
decisions, lack of preparation, and excessive concern with
self-image are more indicative of ineffective combat









































RANK ORDERING OF TOTAL RATINGS
TABLE 3
procedural ability, determination or fixation, the extent
of confidence and the ability to relate to the mission--can
be applied about equally to effective and ineffective combat
aviators
.
The five combined categories with the highest total
ratings appear to be significantly more important in
describing combat performance than the remaining five
categories. An accurate evaluation of a student pilot's
situation awareness, procedural ability, decision making
capacity, determination or fixation, and stress capacity




An additional interesting result of this project is the
rank distribution of the effective or ineffective pilots
described in the interviews. This distribution is shown
in Table 4. While Commanders accounted for 16.7% of the
effective combat pilots, which is approximately their
percentage of the population of Naval aviators , they
represented 32.1% of the ineffective combat pilots. While
a sample size of 30 is too small to make a statistical
inference from this information, there does not appear to
be a logical explanation for the difference. Commanders
who would have been observed in combat are assigned as
Air Group Commanders or Squadron Commanding Officers and
Executive Officers and have been screened by the Bureau of
Naval Personnel for these jobs. On this basis and their
experience level they should be expected to represent a
larger percentage of the effective combat pilots than of




Lieutenant Commander 8 8
Lieutenant 9
. 8
Lieutenant (junior grade) 6 2
Unknown 2 1




VI. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The results of this project indicate that a relatively-
few behavioral categories appear to be required to describe
the combat performance of effective or ineffective Navy
combat pilots. An evaluation system based on the early
identification of these behaviors in student pilots should
not only eliminate a substantial part of the expense of
training pilots who subsequently fail because they cannot
adapt to the operational environment, but should also
improve the combat readiness of those squadrons which have
a combat mission. Those students who are not evaluated as
potentially combat effective and who successfully complete
flight training could be utilized in the many essential
non-combat missions of Naval Aviation.
The evaluation of a student pilot's combat potential
should be completed prior to his assignment to the jet or
propeller training pipelines. The result of this evaluation,
used in conjunction with primary flight grades, would ensure
that those students assigned to jet training not only have
adequate flight proficiency but also are potentially
effective in the operational environment for which they
are being trained. The assignment of students with excel-
lent flight grades but who are not potentially combat
effective to propeller training would raise the flight
proficiency level of junior pilots in non-combat missions.
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Using the behavioral categories defined in this
project, two types of tests could be used to evaluate a
student pilot's combat effectiveness. The two types are
pencil-and-paper situational tests.
Multiple choice, pencil-and-paper tests could be
constructed to measure decision making capacity and the
importance of self-image. These tests should ask "What
would you do?" in a number of hypothetical situations. The
answers would give a choice of actions which represent
different levels of logic or concern with self-image. The
following is an example of a question which Armstrong [21]
suggests would measure decision making capacity.
A pilot has made a forced landing near a mountain cabin.
He finds that the nearest phone is at an isolated ranger's
cabin 14 miles across the mountains to the north. It is
winter. He sets out on foot for the ranger's cabin at
6 a.m., carrying enough food for only one meal. At
10 a.m., having met no one, he comes to three branches
of the trail, all unmarked. It would be best for him to
a. Follow the trail that appears to lead in the
right direction until he reaches the cabin or
the end of the trail.
b. Turn back immediately toward his starting point.
c. Leave the trail and go due north by compass.
d. Walk until noon along the trail that appears
to lead in the right direction; then turn back
if not sure of his location.
e. Stay at the fork in the trail and wait for
someone to come by.
Situation testing could take a variety of forms. One
method of testing behavior and personality in the pre-flight
phase of training would be to include the escape and evasion
and prisoner of war compound segments of survival training
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in pre-flight survival training. These segments are
currently being conducted in the Replacement Air Group.
The escape and evasion segment consists of having the
student evade "agressor" forces while making his way to a
designated objective. If he is captured he should try to
escape if the opportunity presents itself. In this
scenario the student's stress capacity, determination or
fixation, situation awareness, and level of confidence could
be evaluated by observers trained to recognize these
categories. The prisoner of war compound segment consists
of a simulated prisoner of war camp environment in which a
group of students must resist harsh interrogation, establish
an effective organization, and attempt to escape, if possible
This segment offers an opportunity to evaluate the students'
stress capacity, confidence, and concern.
Another method in which situation testing could be
accomplished is by having the student's primary flight
instructors rate him in each category. While each student
is assigned to a specific instructor he is required* to fly
a minimum number of training flights with other instructors.
This requirement should eliminate any bias his assigned
instructor may have. In addition to rating the student on
the other traits the flight instructors could evaluate his
procedural ability, preparation for flights, and communica-
tion ability.
An example of a rating form which could be used in
situational testing is given as Appendix D. This form
29

defines each category as it characterizes effective or
ineffective combat performance and allows the rater to
select an intermediate level of performance if such is
indicated. Before using such scales, behavior typical of
each level of performance should be described on the rating
form. A procedure for scaling behavior in such a fashion
is outlined in Dunnett's Personnel Selection and Placement
[22].
For the foreseeable future the primary mission of the
U.S. Navy will be training for combat operations. The
current reduction in funds and personnel and the rising
cost of aircraft weapons systems make it even more important
that potential aviator combat performance be evaluated,
and those who are predicted to be ineffective be eliminated
or otherwise employed as early as possible. The system
described in this project, using experiences gained in
actual aerial combat to identify those behavioral and
personality traits which characterize effective and ineffec-
tive combat aviators, will allow such early identification.
In the future the Navy will have fewer aircraft, both combat
and combat support, and in the event of hostilities the





I am conducting a study of effective combat aviators in
order to identify them early in flight training. I feel that
the best judges of combat effectiveness are aviators with
combat experience. Therefore, I am asking you to use your
expertise to assist me in both defining combat effectiveness
and identifying characteristics of effective combat aviators.
The information you give me will be treated as strictly
confidential. You do not have to use names of other pilots,
but if you do they will not be reproduced in any record other
than this one, which will be destroyed after the information
has been extracted.
1. Think of an incident in which you have observed a pilot
demonstrate particularly effective combat performance. This
should be in a hostile environment, although active enemy
opposition is not required (i.e., the mission was over the
beach or in contact with the enemy)
.








f. Your impression/feelings at the time
g. Danger level
2. Why was this pilot's behavior particularly combat
effective?
What was this pilot's rank and position in the squadron?
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4. Think of an incident in which you observed a pilot
demonstrate particularly ineffective combat performance.
The same criteria apply.








f. Your impression/feelings at the time
g. Danger level
5. Why was this behavior ineffective?
6. What was the pilot's rank and position in the squadron?
7. I will need some background information on you.
a. Rank and position in squadron at each incident.
b. Pilot/NFO
c. Type aircraft flown.









"the ability to make
logically" correct de-




tency; the ability to
follow a course of action
to its logical conclusion.
_SITUATION AWARENESS: the 3,
ability to integrate inputs
from the environment into
an accurate conception of
the tactical situation.
_STRESS CAPACITY: the 4,
ability to function logi-
cally and effectively in
high stress situations,
i.e., calm, does not
panic, etc.
_PROCEDURAL ABILITY: the 5,
ability to adapt procedures
and tactics to the situa-





not make a decision when
one is required or makes
illogical decisions
based on the available
information.
_FIXATION: concentration
"on one aspect of the




AWARENESS: the lack of
ability to integrate in-
puts from the environment
into an accurate concep-
tion of the tactical
situation. The individual
does not properly assess




the individual does not
function logically or
effectively in high stress
situations, i.e., panics,




or disregards proven tac-
tics with insufficient





"confident in his own
abilities but not to
the extent of conceit.
_CONCERN: the ability to
relate to the mission or
to the individuals involved
in the tactical situation.
COMMUNICATION: the 8,
ability to transmit timely,




his own abilities to the
point of exceeding his
capabilities in a tacti-
cal situation.
_LACK OF CONCERN: the
inability to relate to
the mission or to the
other individuals involved
in the tactical situation.
EXCESSIVE CONCERN WITH
"SELF IMAGE: the individual
is overly concerned with
trying to impress others
to the extent that his
ability to make tactical
decisions is impaired.
_LACK OF PREPARATION: the
individual is not prepared








NARRATIVE EXCERPTS DESCRIBING EFFECTIVE
AND INEFFECTIVE COMBAT BEHAVIORS
I. EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE
A. Decision Making Capacity
"He reacted immediately. He didn't have to think."
"He took command of the Army helicopters, and
guided the boats by using the searchlights."
"On the spot he made the decision not to bother
about the runway at all but to make as many
strafing passes as he could."
"We were with somebody who had some initiative,
who would do something. .. It was questionable at
the time if it was within the rules of engagement."
B. Determination
"He went and did the job, got the rig and the
pictures .
"
"He told me over the radio in no uncertain terms
that he was my wingman and he was going to stay
with me.
"
"He didn't have it in his head to bail out...
He was making it to the water." (Aircraft on
fire over Haiphong, pilot severely wounded.)
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"He would. .. concentrate on exactly what he was
doing for that particular run."
"Perseverance, the fact that they were willing
to take it down in there knowing that there was
a possibility of getting wired into a box (canyon)
and willing to stay down in the stuff just above
gun barrel height." (RESCAP pilot of successful
pickup.
)
"He was super aggressive." (Pilot successfully
destroyed two bridges with Bullpup missiles.)
"He knew that if he didn't get the pictures we would
have to go back... so he continued the mission."
(After aircraft had been hit.)
C. Stress Capacity
"He was extremely calm... He kept himself under
tight control."
"Completely cool... There was no change in his voice
or inflection." (In MIG engagement.)
"He remained cool, in command, planning ahead at
all times."
"We saw roughly seven missiles launched after
the first two
. .





"Primarily he didn't panic."
"What impressed me most was the coolness of
under all this stress."
"He was really good under pressure. . .He didn't
become distracted with his emergency."
"He was cool and he bombed well."
"He would very calmly. .. roll in toward the SAM,
boresight the sight and release his missile."
"...just keeping cool in the situation. He didn't
really get excited when the fire control locked on
or was tracking or when the guns started tracking."
D. Situation Awareness
"He was completely organized."
"He responded to what we had discussed and briefed.
He did it automatically with no conversation."
"He knew the condition of the guy and that he
didn't have enough fuel to get back to the beach...
He knew that there was no flack in the area."
"He had the ability to sort the information in
his mind. He was processing it at a good rate."
"He knew what the hell was going on and reported
it very lucidly." (MIG engagement.)
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"He gave instructions through an interpreter to
the Vietnamese aircraft, coordinated all the
operations on the ground, talked to three dif-
ferent Army command posts. His handling of a
kind of touchy situation was spectacular."
"He realized that it was a threat but he was able
to objectively assess the threat of each missile and
keep his scan going."
"It didn't take us ten passes to get the job done
when only one or two were required."
E. Procedural Ability
"He had boned up on ECM tactics and could converse
in the language we used."
"He had done enough tanking and knew enough
about the A- 4 that he rolled out right in
front of the A-4 in position to tank."
"The whole air wing was engaging MIG's in
tail chase. He broke off and started to yo-yo."
(Pilot shot down three MIG's.)
"We were at 7500 feet. He saw the first missile...
He did a split S through the overcast and the missile
went right through us."
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MHe knew his airplane, knew his weapons systems,
and was able to employ the weapons system as
required by the situation."
"The fuel management was fantastic. He knew
exactly to the letter when he had to quit."
"He could effectively use tactics he knew
and understood." (Pilot took over mission
after scheduled leader was unable to complete
flight.)
"He just ran the whole thing (mission) like he
had done it all his life in terms of his procedures."
F. Communication
"You knew what was against you, you knew what the
odds were, and you knew what you had to do." (Air
Boss of CVA.)
"He calmly said, 'Pull up hard now. ' I did
and the SAM went right under me."
G. Self-Confidence
"He felt he was on top of the problem and so did I."
H. Concern
"That point of responsibility the individual took,





A. Poor Decision Making Capacity
"This hard charging JG...with a crew... in an
aircraft which was not high-performance. . .with
minimum ordnance. .. chose to enter the fray...
As a consequence he got bagged and lost himself,
his airplane and his crew... He was attempting to
do a job he couldn't do anyway."
"He wanted to find if his trigger was hot so he
fogged off a Sparrow missile with no good reason."
"He just didn't think..."
"He wouldn't break a stupid rule to get the
job done."
"They pushed right over into it, came out just
below where the shooting was, leveled off and
got had at... It was a poor decision."
"He certainly made a poor decision considering we
had secondary target ... Once he got in the air he
just decided he was going to the target and the
rest of the brief just went to hell."




"He circled the ship at 3000 feet signalling
with flashing light... If they were enemy that was
the worst move in the world."
"The pilot elected to return to the ship although
at the time of takeoff he had insufficient fuel
to make it.
"
"He didn't believe the information they told
him and he wouldn't go find out. We just milled
around over the Gulf of Tonkin."
"He was picking up heavy ground fire.
.
.He said,
'No, we are going to continue.'" (After being
instructed to break off by air controller in
• charge--shot down.)
"It shows me a leader who is not able to make
that decision which may not be exactly what his
superiors would like to have done but is the most
responsible decision at that time." (Flight
leader continued strike in poor weather.)
B. Fixation
"He would have attacked anything, even if it were




"On night missions he was more concerned with
keeping the aircraft upright than he was about
following navigation, keeping the aircraft in
position where he wanted it or being effective."
(Pilot worried about getting vertigo.)
"He had made 13 attempts ... (All failures) .. .He
was determined to put his sensors in.". (Shot
down by gunfire.)
"He was looking badly for a kill. Instead of
sticking to his formation. .. he left the forma-
tion, running to get his kill." (Shot down.)
"He would get tunnel vision and go in that
direction and I don't think he knew what he was
going to do when he got there."
G. Procedure Violations
"He didn't bother to ask for permission to light
off the ship."
"Even though he was detached he followed lead in. .
.
He didn't use his head and follow squadron doctrine."
'
"He dropped his bombs on safe. He was not pressed
for time or anything."
"We were violating our own rules and (CTF) 77
procedures by violating weather minimums."
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"He was ignoring all kinds of safety pushing a
high-speed jet over in a dive into an overcast
without much below."
"You never go over an overcast. It's a good
way to get bagged.
..
(This procedure) was out,
was it ever out!"
"He did not know if he had to get clearance to
fire or not."
D. Lack of Situation Awareness
"He was over-eager to get the target." (Made
a 60 degree bomb run at night.)
"I felt I didn't have control of the situation."
"They were unable to put the whole thing in
perspective and they were giving credance to
possible reactions and threats that were
unrealistic.
"
"Disrespect for the enemy, not proper respect
for the enemy's capabilities." (Shot down by
ground fire.)
"He wasn't paying attention to what was going
on around him."
"He couldn't have been looking at the terrain
and his map... He couldn't see the bridge where he
thought it should be. From there he proceeded
to get more confused."
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E. Poor Stress Capacity
"The pilot was scared to death... It shook him
up so bad when he got back to the ship, he
boltered four times."
F. Lack of Preparation
"At the brief I knew something was going to
be wrong. It wasn't detailed or specific.
.
.He
didn't have the information ready for .
"
"He was not anywhere near set up (to fire missile)
He was just lackadaisical I guess."
"He was supposed to be leading a four-plane
flight... He didn't know where he was going, he
didn't know the terrain, he didn't know anything
about it."
G. Over-Confidence
"He was complacent. . .He felt that he could get
down and get pictures you couldn't believe."
"I think he was pushing capability of pilots,
airplanes, everything too far there."
H. Lack of Concern
"He pulled off the target, saw the AAA and left
his wingman in a hostile area."
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I. Excessive Concern with Self Image
"You don't get missions counted if you don't
drop bombs... The race was on... He let this
interfere with his good judgment."
"He was number one in number of kills... He
expected to shoot down in every engagement...
He couldn't even dream about his missing another
one. "
"It was probably a big thing for him to come
up and say he didn't have it. He had to prove




PROPOSED STUDENT PILOT EVALUATION FORM
Student's Name Class
Instructor's Name Date
Circle the number on the rating scale which best
describes the student's performance in each area.
Rating
1. Situation Awareness:
Integrates inputs from the environment into
an accurate conception of the tactical
(training) situation. 5
Lacks the ability to integrate inputs from
the environment into an accurate conception
of the tactical (training) situation; does






Adapts procedures and tactics to the




Violates established procedures or 1
disregards proven tactics with insuf-
ficient reason for such deviations.
Not observed
Decision Making Capacity:
Has the ability to make logically correct





Either does not make a decision when one 1
is required or makes illogical decisions






Consistent; has the ability to follow





Fixed; concentrates on one aspect of 1
the tactical (training) situation to
the exclusion of other sensory inputs.
Not observed •
5. Stress Capacity:
Functions logically and effectively
in high stress situations, i.e., calm,




Does not function logically or effectively 1










Is not prepared for the mission, i.e., poor 1




Has a healthy self image; does not overtly




Is overly concerned with trying to impress 1
others to the. extent that his ability to






Is confident in his own abilities,




Overestimates his own abilities to the 1
point of exceeding his capabilities.
Not observed
9. Concern:
Relates to the mission or to the individuals




Is unable to relate to the mission or to the 1
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